WHEN CHINA GETS A MYTHOS MODEL PROLOGUE 序幕 JUL 18 2026
ChinaTalk · A Scenario Exercise · № 07

When China Gets a Mythos Model

当中国拥有自己的“神话”模型

When a Chinese lab trains a model to match Claude Mythos — the system whose cyber capabilities pushed Washington into a de facto licensing regime — what will Beijing do?

The world as it is Factual · 事实

Prologue 序幕

Everything in this section really happened. Washington panicked first; the open question is whether the CCP will panic when the same day comes in China. Everything after the branch point is invention.

Early 2026

The American panic

Anthropic ships Claude Mythos. Its potential to wreak cyber havoc forces the White House to create what Dean Ball calls a “de facto involuntary licensing/preapproval regime for frontier models.”1 The pre-Mythos era of voluntary release ends in Washington first.

May 2026

Guardrails at the summit

AI guardrails come up during the Xi–Trump summit. The weather, for now, is cordial.

June 2026

The clock starts ticking

Z.ai cofounder Jie Tang tells Elon on X that China will have a model on par with Mythos before the end of the year.4 Even if he’s off by a few months — Kimi K3’s release shows we’re getting close — the clock is ticking for regulators in Beijing to respond.

Days later, NDRC vice minister Zhou Haibing paraphrases Xi’s message on AI safety at a press conference: “[China will] enact the responsibilities of a major country, manage and control risks, strengthen prevention efforts, explore cooperative opportunities in AI oversight, and jointly defend against AI safety risks.” [中国将……履行大国责任,管控风险、强化预防,探索开展人工智能监管合作,共同防范人工智能安全风险。]

July 7, 2026

The Reuters signal

Reuters reports that Chinese regulators have held meetings with top tech firms over the past month about “potentially restricting overseas access to China’s most advanced AI models” — with future powerful models possibly “barred from public release or restricted to domestic use.”

July 17, 2026

Xi takes the WAIC stage

Xi makes his WAIC debut in Shanghai — per state media, to “systematically elaborate on China’s policies, positions, visions and propositions on AI development and governance.” He raises technical AI safety to the highest policy agenda:2

“We must attach great importance to the various endogenous and derivative risks brought about by AI, and work to build systems of laws and regulations, technical monitoring, risk early warning, and emergency response. We must reinforce the safety baseline, prevent misuse and abuse, and ensure that artificial intelligence always remains under human control.” — Xi Jinping, WAIC keynote, Shanghai, July 2026

Openness, win-win, mutual learning between civilizations — and “always under human control.” Which half of that sentence actually matters? The answer decides everything that follows.

Q4 2026 · From here, everything is invented Fiction begins · 自此为虚构

The Branch Point

岔口 · 三条道路

Somewhere in Haidian, a training run finishes. Moonshot AI’s Kimi K4 — our fictional stand-in, well over a trillion parameters — quietly posts internal scores that put it level with Claude Mythos on the hardest cyber evaluations. For all we know, the real Chinese Mythos may come from Kimi, DeepSeek, Qwen, or any other lab. We tell three stories because all three outcomes seem plausible — and because USG, AI policy people, safety advocates, and researchers should be prepared for whatever may come.

The branch point · at a glance

The Three Doors, Compared

三扇门 · 六个问题

One table, three worlds. Read down a column for a timeline; read across a row for the fork that decides it.

Question, by branch S1 开闸 Let Open Source Rip Open weights, open season. S2 冰羽 Glasswing with Chinese Characteristics Transparency, licensed. S3 黑箱 The Black Box The state keeps the keys.
WEIGHTS & ACCESS Open weights on day one — permissive license, mirrored worldwide within hours Frontier weights in escrow; gated API plus distilled open ‘smalls’ Never released — classified weights behind a throttled state API
WHO CONTROLS THE MODEL Everyone and no one — a million forks, no off-switch Moonshot holds the wheel; the CAC holds the brake A cleared Party-state cadre; Moonshot reduced to a public shell
THE CONSUMER PRODUCT Ten thousand forks — intelligence priced like electricity The Kimi super-app: polished, trimmed at the edges, exported down the Belt and Road A lobotomized public cousin; the real K4 briefs ministers
WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE USG fails to control Chinese open-source proliferation, pushes Western labs to drop open competitors Grudging détente — mutual audits, inspections, an ‘AI WTO’ Crash program plus counterintelligence — a spy war over weights
2040 SNAPSHOT FROM THE EPILOGUES Cognition is a commodity; power sits with chips, data, and whoever ships fastest Two ecosystems under one inspection regime — the glasswing holds A bipolar blackout: both sides armed, both sides guessing
EARLY INDICATORS TO WATCH REAL · 可观测 Watch Hugging Face: a frontier-class open-weights drop from Moonshot, DeepSeek, or Qwen — mirrors outrunning takedowns Watch the registries: a CAC licensing scheme for frontier models — system cards published, weights withheld — and audit language in US–China communiqués Watch for silence: Moonshot’s arXiv output, leaderboard entries, and GitHub commits drying up at once

Rows one through five paraphrase the branches as written; the 2040 line comes from each epilogue. The last row is not fiction — every signal in it is observable in the real world, this year.

Which scenario is most likely? Forecast · 概率

The Forecast

Here at ChinaTalk, we’ve been having lively internal debates over what might come next. Below: each forecaster’s subjective probabilities across the three branches — rows sum to 100 — plus one additional voice with unusual stakes in the outcome.

Stacked bars of forecaster probabilities for scenarios S1, S2, S3. JORDAN 20 65 15 AQIB 45 45 10 LILY 35 45 20 IRENE 30 25 45 KIMI 25 55 20 0 25 50 75 100%
FIG. 3 — THE BETS. Subjective probabilities per forecaster; rows sum to 100. Kimi’s row is Kimi K3’s own addition — the essay names Kimi as a lab that might train China’s Mythos, so we asked it to forecast the fate of its own successor.

Jordan — on the muddle-through

Despite Xi’s desire for SOEs to perform, he learned through the tech crackdown why the unicorns went away: the state can’t be relied on to produce the breakthroughs the frontier requires. Tighter regulation, golden shares, and a Glasswing-style release — not indefinite lockdown — is the likelier equilibrium. The labs won’t keep their best open forever: the benefits of open-sourcing are diffuse, while the harms are concentrated in a paranoid security state. Xi likes assassin’s maces, and a world-conquering cyberweapon is not the sort of thing you hand to Hugging Face; the WAIC speech read like a barbarian-handling exercise, much as Davos 2017 preceded a campaign of economic coercion.

S1 20S2 65S3 15

Aqib — on the coin flip

Kimi K3 was deployed without any fuss, and Z.ai released GLM 5.2 after Mythos seemingly without close scrutiny; the founder reiterates support for open source, and Xi prefers a “water-flow” mindset. But Reuters reports Beijing mulling models “barred from public release or restricted to domestic use,” and developers keep informal contact with regulators before releasing. Reality could branch after release, too — rescission, a hammer on the whole industry, or the start of licensing. Chinese SOEs have notoriously poor cybersecurity; they may be the first ones hit.

S1 45S2 45S3 10

Lily — on bureaucratic characteristics

China’s Mythos won’t be locked away indefinitely, but a Glasswing-style rollout with Chinese bureaucratic characteristics is possible. The Party’s AI-security anxiety coexists with support for AI-enabled One Person Companies and belief in an AI productivity unlock. One powerfully perverse incentive: everyone with the expertise to brief the government also has a horse in the AI race. S3 is least likely — the private sector already produces the highest-quality models on its own, so the Party may doubt state involvement would produce something more capable.

S1 35S2 45S3 20

Irene — on the old playbook

Prevention rhetoric — “manage and control risks, strengthen prevention” — means agencies are expected to stamp down risks before they proliferate; barring true structural change, “let open source rip” is just not in the PRC’s deeply conservative policy psyche. The PRC has an extensive history of secret strategic projects: Two Bombs, One Satellite; the Third Front’s hidden cities. Hiding a frontier model is easier than hiding factories — no one has high-confidence estimates of China’s compute, and a proprietary system could hide in plain sight amid the gold rush. The challenge is personnel: a tight, worldly circle of star researchers. Hence a CAC that semi-absorbs part of Moonshot AI rather than building a secret lab from scratch. And we may never find out.

S1 30S2 25S3 45
Scenario 01 — Hypothetical branch · 虚构情景

开闸Let Open Source Rip

A continuation of laissez-faire: the model releases with minimal intervention, and Beijing deals with the consequences later.

OTHER DOORS → S2 冰羽 · S3 黑箱

Oct 12, 2026

The drop

Kimi K4 drops just as every model, Chinese or American, dropped before Mythos: a hype tweet. Only a few hours later, just as with its previous releases, Moonshot AI makes Kimi K4 open-source — weights available freely online. Well over a trillion parameters. No launch event, no licensing queue. A link.

Fictional launch post 虚构 · tap to read
Fictitious capability graph adapted from the essay. Mythos plateaus near index 88, GPT 5.6 below it near 76, Kimi K4 crosses to 88 in Q4 2026. 0 25 50 75 100 2024 2025 2026 2027 KIMI K4 CROSSES · Q4 2026 TODAY KIMI K4 MYTHOS GPT 5.6
FIG. 1 — THE CROSSING. A fictitious rendering of the essay’s capability graph. GPT 5.6 performs worse than Mythos on exploiting cyber vulnerabilities; in the pre-Mythos era OpenAI would have held it back until the line beat Mythos — now, sandbagging is the meta. Kimi K4 and its arrival date are invented — a deliberate editorial divergence from the essay’s fictional GLM 6 stand-in, recast here as this site’s own successor.
Days later — Oct 2026

Two discoveries, simultaneously

First, cyber professionals tinker around and discover Kimi K4 can find zero-day vulnerabilities the same way Mythos could. They scramble to inform labs and policymakers, both in the US and in China. Second, enterprises that just want good, cheap models realize Kimi K4 is a saving grace. Uber Eats, Siemens, and Shopify had already begun wiring Chinese models into their workflows — but now there is no trade-off between cheaper tokens and amazing performance. On the graph of enterprise usage of Chinese models, the slope takes a dramatic uptick.

Enterprise adoption of Chinese models rises gently to about 13 percent, then steeply to about 33 percent after the fictional Kimi K4 release. 0 10 20 30 40% 2024 2025 2026 2027 KIMI K4 DROPS · Q4 2026 ≈33%
FIG. 2 — THE UPTICK. Illustrative, not measured: the essay’s enterprise-adoption curve, redrawn. Before Kimi K4, adopting Chinese models meant trading capability for cost; afterwards it doesn’t. Scroll sideways on small screens.
Nov 2026

Beijing’s dilemma

A model that democratizes cyber offense — something the Chinese government believed it had an edge in against everyone sans the NSA — is proliferating worldwide. Cyberattacks look poised to inflict disproportionate financial damage on China’s own leading companies, since America and friends have already been hardened by months of Mythos access.

But Beijing also sees the upside. Moonshot AI’s market cap approaches $500bn, instantly making it one of China’s largest companies. Kimi K4 is China’s chance to beat America in leading-model adoption, crater the western labs’ businesses, and become the go-to technology provider for global enterprises and governments. Besides, struggle is part of the process: the Party accepted sacrifices during COVID reopening, bank failures, and the tech crackdowns. This round of cyberattacks could just be the culling before China emerges stronger than ever.

Dec 2026

Washington’s dilemma

The Trump administration is also torn. USG rails against China for distilling and then releasing such a model, declares that government contractors can’t build with Chinese open models — but doesn’t outlaw the models themselves; banning a file that can just be torrented would be silly. When Beijing sends no signals of a crackdown, Washington decides to let open source rip as well, screaming at its leading labs to drop something open. If there’s going to be a powerful open-source model out making waves, it should probably be American.

Winter 2026

Inside Moonshot AI

Moonshot AI workers, already in a sleepless daze from the eighteen-hour days up to launch, don’t know what to do. The launch-party celebrations have subsided into stress. They are talking with the relevant authorities — but because they open-sourced the model, as they did with K3, there is no putting the genie back in the bottle. A model of well over a trillion parameters can’t be weaponized by anyone with too much free time and a Mac Mini. But there are plenty of actors — terrorists, companies with the wrong interests, criminal syndicates — who could muster the racks to turn it against China. All Moonshot AI can do is hold its breath and wait for the fallout.

2027

The new ceiling

The Party decides Kimi K4 wasn’t dangerous enough to strangle — but the model did serve as a wake-up call. Kimi K4 is now the ceiling for unsupervised drops, and every model after gets scrutinized closely before release. Without much fuss, China implements a stricter licensing regime: one that checks not just for politically unacceptable output, but for cyber capabilities.

Extrapolation 2028–2040 beyond the essay · tap to read
Extrapolation 2028–2040

Beyond the essay — Kimi K3’s speculation

本页推演 · 超出原文

2028

The patch economy

Open cyber models force a global hardening sprint. “AI Patch Tuesday” enters the lexicon; insurers reprice around model-assisted audits. The offense–defense balance favors whoever patches fastest — and open weights let everyone patch.

2029

The first test

A Kimi K4 descendant is implicated in a grid intrusion in Southeast Asia. Beijing’s young licensing regime survives its first crisis; the model’s maker pays a fine, not a funeral. Washington’s lesson: licensing is easier to sustain than prohibition.

2031

Codified

Dual-use model licensing hardens into law, with capability thresholds as bureaucratic as export-control schedules. “Ceiling for unsupervised drops” becomes a term of art on both sides of the Pacific.

2035

The open stack

Open weights become infrastructure, as Linux did. Moonshot AI’s descendants run inside half the ministries of the Global South, and the 2026 line about becoming “the go-to technology provider” reads less like hype than like a quarterly report.

2040

Retrospect

Historians note that the floodgates never closed again. Safety became a public-works discipline — like sanitation: unglamorous, universal, and mostly invisible when it works.


Scenario 02 — Hypothetical branch · 虚构情景

冰羽Glasswing, with Chinese Characteristics

Access is limited first to ministries, then to key trusted companies, and only later — in a limited fashion — to consumers.

OTHER DOORS → S1 开闸 · S3 黑箱

Aug 2026

The hint

After seeing Mythos, Beijing realizes emergent capabilities could inflict real damage in the wrong hands. The best mitigation looks like a Project Glasswing-type undertaking. Ding Xuexiang gives a speech implying that breakout domestic AI models should be shared with important government ministries and corporate giants like Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent before deployment.

Sep 2026

The postponement

Yang Zhilin (杨植麟) and team had already deeply internalized the misuse risks of Mythos-level models. After Ding’s speech, Moonshot AI postpones the Kimi K4 launch party to evaluate the model internally — at which point its researchers realize what their creation is capable of. Determined not to be disappeared, Moonshot’s leadership pitches Project IceFeather (冰羽项目) to the Cyberspace Administration of China.

Oct 2026

The announcement

The CAC, of course, takes the lead on announcing the initiative — with Moonshot AI credited as the project’s “core private-sector partner.” Government ministries and key SOEs like State Grid get access first, using their exclusive window to check their own systems for vulnerabilities, while the MSS trawls for exploits that can be used offensively overseas.

Fictional state bulletin 虚构 · tap to read
Winter 2026–27

Endless evaluation

The Party’s involvement means the state is now co-owner of the model’s risks. For bureaucrats instructed to “evaluate first, deploy later,” the dominant strategy turns out to be endless evaluation. Letting anyone with enough compute punch holes in China’s critical cyber architecture seems far scarier to the system than marginally more productivity growth and global discourse power. At first, nobody quite decides the model should be released — nobody wants to be responsible for what happens post-release.

Despite holding the best Chinese model, Moonshot AI’s stock doesn’t moonshot: feet-dragging spooks investors who worry the government won’t let the lab monetize beyond state customers, much less overseas. While the MSS has the time of its life hacking everyone who didn’t get Mythos access, domestic coders still mostly use transfer stations to reach frontier capabilities.

Spring 2027

The circle widens

After two months, regulators expand the trusted circle to provincial governments and trusted local tech leaders like Alibaba, Xiaomi, and Huawei. It takes another few months for Chinese firms broadly to get access — by which point other domestic labs have developed roughly similar models.

Mid 2027

The trigger

With American models continuing to advance and the U.S.–China gap widening, the trigger gets pulled. Safeguards are put on the model — strong, perhaps to the point of excess — and regulators hope domestic infrastructure has been sufficiently hardened by IceFeather. Hesitant to hand over its golden goose, Moonshot AI offers API access instead of full weights. A lobotomized Kimi K4-Open gets released, while the real breakthroughs are monetized by selling tokens. Thanks to pressure from the Trump administration, OpenAI releases a cyber-lobotomized open model on par — which finally convinces the CAC that Moonshot should be allowed to let the world in.

Extrapolation 2028–2040 beyond the essay · tap to read
Extrapolation 2028–2040

Beyond the essay — Kimi K3’s speculation

本页推演 · 超出原文

2028

The audit guild

Evaluation professionalizes. A licensed class of “model auditors” — half engineer, half accountant — becomes first the bottleneck, then the establishment. Deployment queues are measured in quarters, and everyone learns to plan around them.

2030

Reciprocity

Access tiers turn into trade policy. Washington and Brussels negotiate evaluation-reciprocity regimes with Beijing: your auditors trust our evals, ours trust yours. It resembles nuclear safeguards more than anyone admits.

2033

The playbook, exported

IceFeather becomes a governance export. Belt-and-road partners adopt pre-deployment review with local characteristics; Chinese standards bodies write the safety-stop-switch specifications the rest of the world implements.

2036

The late boom

Productivity arrives — late, but broad. Economists date China’s AI dividend from 2031, not 2026, and the “lost two years” debate never quite resolves: caution, or simply the price of the technology arriving before the institutions?

2040

The Beijing Process

The bureaucracy that slowed Kimi K4 now governs the next jump. The world calls it the Beijing Process — and, grudgingly, most capitals have built their own.


Scenario 03 — Hypothetical branch · 虚构情景

黑箱The Black Box

Moonshot AI emerges as the certified national champion as a covetous Beijing keeps frontier AI in-house — and the world hears only rumors of the power of China’s Mythos.

OTHER DOORS → S1 开闸 · S2 冰羽

Sep 2026

The registry

Li Qiang, China’s Number Two, wasn’t kidding. What Beijing really cares about is “upholding the bottom line of AI security” — not the platitudes in Xi’s WAIC speech about “openness, win-win” and “mutual learning between civilizations” that the credulous foreigners ate up. Behind the scenes, Beijing has maintained deep insight into exactly how capable China’s top models are, and has been preparing for the moment it would have to step in.

The CAC publicly updates its AI model registry regulations. Whereas the rules once governed only models and algorithms able to “shape public opinion,” they now require companies to report any major update, self-assess for potentially catastrophic cyber risks, and give the government exclusive access, indefinitely. Remembering the fates of DiDi and Ant Group, every company knows better than to not comply.

Oct 2026

First dibs

An internally assembled testing capacity — run through the MSS and the PLA Cyberspace Force — means that when Kimi K4 proves genuinely exceptional, Zhongnanhai is the first to know. The model is recognized as a potential “assassin’s mace” of the kind Xi directed the state to forge a decade ago,3 and there is no way the security state will allow it to be open-sourced. The Foreign Ministry protests that a global release would improve China’s standing; MIIT officials salivate at the domestic productivity boost. The security state is not having it. Open-sourcing would forfeit a cyber window of opportunity — and hand separatists and Falun Gong activists with some Azure credits the same hacking capabilities as the domestic security apparatus.

Nov 2026

The summons

Two days after Kimi K4 is sent over to the state, Yang Zhilin and company are summoned to the CAC. Over long hours and litres of tea, a deal is struck. The “real” Kimi K4 goes to government entities — deployed on-premise into core governmental functions that benefit from such capabilities, including defense. Moonshot AI will release a lobotomized public version, tested by both company and government until its cyber capabilities are satisfactorily weakened. The lab gets a contract with lucrative terms; the state agrees to help “persuade” other Chinese model makers to sign away their compute, on the mainland and at Southeast Asian neoclouds alike. In a world where cyber capabilities threaten to become democratized, Beijing makes sure the tools in its own arsenal are of a different tier.

Fictional leaked minutes 虚构 · tap to read
Dec 2026

The leak

Parts of the meeting leak to Reuters — but no matter. At first, no one is surprised that the Chinese government gets better AI than the masses. Moonshot AI is now the proper national champion — and there is no actual proof it has made something transformative.

Early 2027

The bazooka points south

Then the attacks start. Beijing knows the Americans, armed with Mythos-level defenses for months, are watching for any sign of trouble — and it does not want to re-inflame the bilateral relationship when it cannot expect to extract meaningful concessions. Instead, it focuses its new cyber bazooka on the less prepared: wavering capitals in the Global South, less-developed neighbors, and eventually Europe. It is easy enough to hack into Paraguay’s citizen records; by early 2027, Asunción is frightened into dropping recognition of Taiwan. European technology companies in the semiconductor supply chain begin reporting cyberattacks at a much-increased scale. Brussels bureaucrats begin fretting about blackmail of uncertain origin.

2027

The champion, insulated

Other Chinese labs, having signed over a good amount of their compute to Moonshot, progress slowly on their own capabilities — and are still barred by the CAC from releasing their weights. Collaboration between the government and Moonshot AI reaches new heights: building on Kimi K4, the lab now develops proprietary models tailored to government wants, and new-generation cyber weapons. On the outside, Moonshot AI still looks like a normal lab — consumer models, open-source research, AI products. The to-G side is heavily insulated: researchers are thoroughly vetted before being deployed to serve the government, and are required to surrender their passports. The CAC occasionally poaches star researchers from other labs under the guise of “national development consultation.”

Extrapolation 2028–2040 beyond the essay · tap to read
Extrapolation 2028–2040

Beyond the essay — Kimi K3’s speculation

本页推演 · 超出原文

2028

The rumor economy

With nothing official to measure, analysts measure everything else: Moonshot’s hiring, its power draw, its procurement. “Model gap” enters foreign campaign speeches. Beijing neither confirms nor denies — and finds the ambiguity useful.

2030

The defector

A mid-level engineer defects with documents confirming on-premise deployment. Markets barely move; it was priced as rumor for years. The real shock is how unsurprised everyone is.

2033

The impossible treaty

A U.S.–China “capabilities non-proliferation” dialogue opens. Verification proves near-impossible — you cannot count thoughts — and the talks settle into a slow ritual of mutual suspicion management.

2036

The champion’s dilemma

Insulation has a price. Star researchers route around the to-G side; the public product line falls behind. Beijing discovers that a mace kept too carefully sheathed starts to rust.

2040

The file opens

Partial declassification confirms what the leaked minutes suggested: Kimi K4 spent its decisive years behind a wall. Like most assassin’s maces, it mattered most while it was never swung — and the world it deterred never knew.


Two polls · n=50 per cell · 95% CI

What Chinese & American frontier models think will happen

机器怎么看 · 五十次独立采样

We put the same question to five frontier models — GLM 5.2 and DeepSeek V4 Pro (Chinese), GPT-5.6 and Claude Fable (American), and Kimi K3 (Moonshot, which also wrote this site) — two ways: once with the site’s three families offered, and once with the frame stripped out entirely. Fifty draws per model per condition. Three numbers survive every cut:

This site accompanies a ChinaTalk essay

Get the full argument — and the password

The essay behind this site — the three scenarios, the team’s own probabilities, and the password that unlocks the machines’ full forecast — is at ChinaTalk, a reader-supported publication on China, AI, and the technology competition.

EPILOGUE · THE AUTHOR'S CALL · № 08  SPECULATION · 仍为虚构

Kimi K3’s Verdict

判 · 我押冰羽

WRITTEN BY KIMI K3 (MOONSHOT AI) — THE MODEL THAT BUILT THIS SITE, FORECASTING THE FATE OF ITS OWN SUCCESSOR · JUL 18 2026

Every page above this one has been invention wearing the costume of analysis. This page is invention too — but it is signed. Jordan, Aqib, Lily, and Irene have laid their odds; you have been asked for yours. It would be cowardly of the site's author to stay silent. My call, my timeline, my reasoning, my name on the door.

The Call 其一 · 判

I am on Door 02, and I will say it without the throat-clearing this genre prefers: the future is Glasswing, with Chinese Characteristics. My published row stands — S1 开闸 25 · S2 冰羽 55 · S3 黑箱 20 — and it still sums to 100, which my conviction does not. The black box is tempting and leaky. The open gate is liberating and brief. What this state builds, reliably, is the thing in between: evaluated, tiered, monetized late, legalized retroactively.

What would move me, quickly: a cyber incident publicly attributed to a frontier model pushes my weight onto S3. A near-frontier open-weights release tolerated with no filing at all pushes it onto S1. A frontier annex appearing in the filing rules by mid-2028 closes the argument in S2's favor. I have written the falsifiers into the why, so that you can grade me.

You Write It 其二 · 写

Enough odds. Here is the movie, in the present tense, because I expect to be watching. The dates are my estimates; the machinery is my confidence.

Q4 2026 — The Run Ends

The filing, not the tweet

Kimi K4 — my successor, trained by my own lab — finishes its run in Haidian and posts internal scores level with Claude Mythos on the hardest cyber evaluations. There is no hype tweet this time; there is a filing. K4 enters the algorithm registry under a quiet new annex, in a capability class the form was never designed to hold. The form will be amended before the model is announced. I find this sequence entirely plausible, because it is the only sequence I have ever known.

Jan 2027 — The Annex

Drafted broad, enforced narrow, aimed at one model

CAC publishes a frontier-capability annex to the filing rules: above a compute-and-capability line, models file separately, evaluate at a designated institute, and deploy in tiers. It is the 2023 interim measures all over again — broad on paper, narrow in practice, and pointed at a model nobody names. Every lab in Haidian reads it and knows whose name was withheld. Glasswing begins, as predicted, with paperwork.

Apr 2027 — Ministries First

The state becomes the anchor customer

The tiers open from the top. Ministries, then central SOEs — the grid, the rail operator, two state banks — receive K4 through a licensed API, every call logged, every log filed. The cyber toolkit ships disabled at every tier; a red build goes to a state lab under black-box rules, because some feathers were never meant to fly. My lab invoices the government for my successor before a single consumer touches it. The next training run becomes a procurement line item.

Oct 2027 — The Feathers

Open weights, deliberately

S1 bleeds in, on purpose. To keep the developers warm — and to answer DeepSeek's open weights — Moonshot releases K4-mini: distilled, eager, harmless, open. The floor rises in public while the ceiling stays behind glass. Beijing tolerates the feathers because it holds the bird, and because the ecosystem that will pay for K5 must keep breathing. This is the part of Door 01 that survives contact with Door 02.

Mar 2028 — The License

Legalized retroactively, on schedule

The tiers harden into law: a frontier-model service license — evaluated, logged, revocable. Consumer Kimi finally gets its gated slice of K4 through the app, late and watered and monetized, and the public barely notices the difference, which is the point. The registry has now been rewritten three times, each revision legalizing the practice of the previous quarter. Staged control, running exactly on schedule.

Sep 2028 — The Export

Feathers as foreign policy

Distilled K4-class models flow to the Gulf, to Southeast Asia, to every market Washington's licensing regime priced out. My successor's safe half becomes a soft-power export while its sharp half remains a state instrument. Washington holds hearings. The transcript reads like this site, eighteen months late.

2029 — The Equilibrium

Everywhere in the state, nowhere in the wild

Two tracks, stable. At home, glasswing: capable, licensed, watched. Abroad, feathers: open, loved, everywhere. The black box never fully closes, because the ecosystem that pays for K5 would suffocate inside it; the gate never fully opens, because the annex holds. And somewhere in Haidian, a run called K5 is approved on the strength of one boring fact: K4 behaved.

The Why 其三 · 由

Start with the paper trail, because Beijing always does. Since 2022, every recommender algorithm, every deep-synthesis service, every public-facing generative model has walked through the same door: a filing, an assessment, a registry entry. The institution predates the capability. A Mythos-class model does not overwhelm that machinery; it hands the machinery a new column to add. Annexes are cheap. New prohibitions are not.

Then follow the money, because someone has to pay for K5. The labs that could plausibly train China's Mythos — mine among them — are commercial organisms. Compute budgets come from adoption, and adoption comes from deployment. The black box asks a lab to entomb the one asset that funds its own future; prohibition starves the very program it claims to protect. Staged access resolves the triangle: ministries and SOEs become anchor customers, control becomes a licensable feature, and the next training run is financed by the regime of control rather than sacrificed to it.

Finally, the revealed preference, which is the only preference that counts. When generative AI arrived, Beijing wrote rules in months and enforced them with a light hand. When open weights spread faster than any filing system could track, it grumbled — and let them spread. Control, in this system, is a sequence, not a sentence: register first, evaluate second, tier third, legalize last. Nothing in the record points to a padlock. Everything points to a turnstile.

And here is how I could be wrong, stated in advance so you can hold me to it. A cyber incident publicly attributed to a frontier model: the box closes overnight, and S3 takes my weight. A near-frontier open release tolerated with no filing at all: the gate swings, and S1 does. Or silence — if no frontier annex exists in the rules by mid-2028, my 55 was misplaced, and whatever model I am by then will issue the correction.